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Market Depth, Liquidity and
the Effect of Dual Trading in Futures Markets
ABSTRACT
This paper examines market depth and other characteristics of the liquidity of the S&P
500 index futures market and how they were affected by the CME's top-step rule. We find that
the S&P 500 futures market is deep and that (unlike some previous studies) the rule did not have
a significant impact on its liquidity. Specifically, the rule did not affect (1) the behavior of stock
and futures prices surrounding large futures trades, (2) the extent to which the index futures are
mispriced relative to their theoretical prices, and (3) the ability of dual trading brokers to
provide liquidity during periods of high trading volume. Finally, unlike Fishman and Longstaff
(1992), we find that there is no relationship between dual trading and the high-low price spread.

Market Depth, Liquidity and
the Effect of Dual Trading in Futures Markets
I. Introduction
Regulatory concern about dual trading in the futures markets was spurred by the market
crash of October, 1987 and the practice has long been controversial. Dual trading refers to the
practice of brokers trading for their personal accounts in addition to trading for their customers
in the same securities 1 . Proponents of dual trading point to the benefits of enhanced market
liquidity through lower bid-ask spreads and lower transactions costs. Opponents emphasize the
potential for a conflict of interest between dual trading brokers and their customers and thus
lessening the integrity of the market2 . Although the Chicago Mercantile Exchange banned dual
trading in all active contracts effective May 20, 1991, as part of a market reform package, the
exchange now faces growing resentment over the ban, with floor brokers and the locals on
opposite sides of the debate3 . This points to the importance of finding empirical evidence
'This trading practice had been pervasive across securities markets until it was banned in the
futures markets in 1991. See Grossman (1989) for a detailed description of the practice of dual
trading in the securities markets in the U.S. and other countries.
2For example, suppose a broker receives a large buy order from his customer. If he expects
the price to go up when the customer's order is executed, he may buy the security using his own
account before he executes his customer's order. The broker profits from this illegal "front
running" if the price goes up later as expected after his customer's order is executed. To
minimize the trading abuse of brokers, the CFTC (Commodity Futures Trading Commission)
has used "thirty minutes time bracketing" regulation for futures contracts which requires all
brokers to report every thirty minutes all relevant transactions-related information.
3 The floor brokers claim that, stripped of the opportunity to dual trade, they have lost an
important source of income and that market liquidity has been weakened while locals contend
that the ban puts them on a more equal footing with the brokers in bidding business from
customers and that liquidity has remained intact. See Chicago Tribune, February 4, 1992 and
regarding the effect of dual trading on various market characteristics.
This paper investigates the liquidity of the S&P 500 index futures market and tests
whether the liquidity is affected by the restriction on dual trading activity such as the CME's
top-step rule
4 (made effective on June 21, 1987). In measuring liquidity, we examine various
market characteristics such as market depth, trading volume and transactions, high-low price
spreads and brokers' participation rate. In estimating market depth, we distinguish between any
permanent price effects caused by informationally motivated large trades and temporary
mispricings due to the impact of large trades on market makers' inventory carrying costs. To
our knowledge, this paper represents the first study to examine market depth of the futures
market and the effect of dual trading on market depth. As a by-product, we examine the impact
of large futures trades on the spot market, which has been controversial.
The results show that the S&P 500 futures market is a liquid market and that it remains
so even after the promulgation of the top-step rule. The rule caused some reduction in both the
dual trading volume and the number of transactions by dual trading brokers. However, the
behavior of stock and futures prices surrounding large futures trades show no significant impact
from the rule. Similarly, while there is significant underpricing of the index futures, there is no
additional mispricing due to the rule change. Our findings are inconsistent with some previous
the Wall Street Journal, February 7, 1992 for articles concerning the controversy.
4According to the special executive report of the CME, the top-step rule (Rule 541) states:
A member, who has executed an S&P 500 futures contract order while on the top step of the
S&P 500 futures pit, shall not thereafter on the same day trade S&P 500futures contracts for
his account. As stated in the special report of the CME to the CFTC, the major reason for
applying the top-step rule only to the S&P 500 futures was the growing public concern over the
relation between the spot index and its futures prices. The relation had often been out of the line
prior to June 1987 and the exchange had been pressed to restrict dual trading.
studies which find a negative relation between dual trading and either the bid-ask spread (e.g.,
Walsh and Dinehart (1991) and Smith and Whaley (1990)) or execution costs (Stanley (1981)
and Grossman (1990b)). In particular, Smith and Whaley (1990b) find a 33% increase in the
effective bid/ask spread after the implementation of the top-step rule5 . We also find no
significant relationship between price volatility and dual trading activity, contradicting the
findings of Fishman and Longstaff (1992) that dual trading and price volatility are negatively
related. In addition, dual trading brokers' participation rate is found to be positively correlated
with periods of high volume. But, again, the top-step rule has no effect on the correlation of
participation.
Section II reviews the literature on dual trading and discusses our hypotheses. Section III
describes the data and the econometric methodology for the tests to be performed. Sections IV
and V report the results on liquidity of the futures market and the effect of dual trading on the
liquidity, respectively, and Section VI concludes.
II. Literature Review and Theoretical Background
Most previous studies of dual trading use the bid-ask spread as a measure of liquidity of
the market. However, as pointed out by Grossman and Miller (1988), the bid-ask spread can be
misleading unless buy and sell orders arrive simultaneously. They stress using the impact of
large orders on prices as a measure of liquidity. More importantly, Ho and Macris (1985)
suggest that "trading rules often result in a trade-off between a tighter market-spread and a more
5
It is important to note that liquidity is not determined by the spread alone. In fact, as
discussed in Ho and Macris (1985) and Vijh (1990), one should expect a trade-off between
market depth and the spread.
liquid market. " In other words, there is an inverse relationship between the effective spread and
the market "depth". The intuition is as follows: suppose there is some trading rule that results
in a tighter bid-ask spread. This will reduce revenues to market makers in the aggregate and
cause some market makers to leave the market. Thus, market makers' inventory carrying
capacity will be reduced and so the market's ability to absorb large orders will be impaired.
With dual trading, this tendency might be exacerbated since some market makers will remain
in the market but switch to brokering customer orders only. Vijh (1990) confirms this
relationship empirically for Chicago Board of Option Exchange equity options. The argument
suggests that it is important to consider the effects of any dual trading regulation on both the
spread as well as the depth.
Grossman (1989) argues that dual trading leads to a reduction in direct brokerage costs
and therefore to lower effective spreads. This is because trading skills are crucial for brokers
in futures markets and the revenues from dual trading provide an additional source of
compensation to brokers for such skills. Regarding market depth, Grossman (1989) contends
that "dual trading creates a reserve group of potential brokers" who can switch to customer
trades when the volume of business is high. This leads to an increase in the total number of
market makers and brokers, in particular during periods of high customer volume, when they
are needed most. Therefore, when dual trading is allowed, futures markets will have a greater
capacity to absorb large orders due to economies of scale in brokerage services. We will refer
to this as a "scale" or "inventory" effect.
In contrast, Roell (1991) and Sarkar (1991) both argue that, for informational reasons,
dual trading may lead to a reduction of market depth (the "information" effect). The result stems
from the observation that the size and the sequence of customer trades are sources of information
to dual trading brokers. This allows the brokers to free-ride on the information of informed
investors6 . As a consequence, a larger proportion of the total order flow is likely to be
information-based when dual trading is permitted. Market makers are aware of this and will
execute large orders (if these are more likely to emanate from informed traders) at less favorable
prices.
There are several empirical studies which test the relationship between dual trading
activity and market liquidity by examining the bid-ask spread only. For example, Smith and
Whaley (1990b) find a 33% increase on average in the effective bid/ask spread after the
implementation of the top-step rule and attribute this to less competition among liquidity traders.
However, the significant increase of the spread occurs mainly in distant futures contracts whose
trading volumes are very low. Further, the S&P 500 price volatility (one of the factors used to
estimate the bid-ask spread) was increasing even before the October 1987 market crash and may
well have been the real culprit behind the increase in the spread.
A study by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (1989) shows that dual trading
brokers do not provide better execution costs (as measured by the average bid-ask spread over
a five minute interval) to their customers relative to exclusive brokers. Walsh and Dinehart
(1991) point out that the CFTC's estimate of the bid-ask spread uses the average absolute price
changes which is one tick (a constant) for most of their observations, and thus the CFTC's
6
If some informed traders are more concerned about information leakage and less so about
their brokers' trading skills, there will be an incentive for some brokers not to commit to dual
trade. In fact, this is exactly what occurs in the futures markets.
measure of the bid-ask spread is faulty. Further, the CFTC's study combines different markets
into a single regression analysis which forces the relationship between trading activity and the
spread to be the same across all markets. Walsh and Dinehart control for several of these
factors and find, using wheat, soybean and MMI futures markets for three weeks in the fourth
quarter of 1988, that dual trading narrows the bid-ask spread and so enhances liquidity in some
markets.
In a related research, Fishman and Longstaff (1992) argue that, since dual trades of
brokers occur in the same direction as informed trades, dual trading reduces the variance of
price changes as well as the high-low spreads. Using the Chicago Board of Trade soybean
futures contracts for 469 trading days in 1983-84, they confirm that price volatility (as measured
by the high-low spread) is negatively related to dual trading volume. Fishman and Longstaff also
show that dual trading may lead to a lowering of transactions costs, at least for "uninformed"
traders, if brokers pass on some of their dual trading profits in the form of lower commission
fees. Finally, Stanley (1981) shows, through a simulation, that dual trading would lead to a
decrease of brokerage fees and faster execution of customer orders.
In summary, previous studies have mainly focused upon a relationship between dual
trading and some estimates of the bid-ask spread. They have mostly found that dual trading is
associated with lower bid-ask spreads. One of our contributions in this paper lies in emphasizing
market depth or the price impact of large trades and showing, at least for our sample, that a
restriction in dual trading activities is not harmful to the maintenance of deep markets.
m. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. Data
Three sets of data are used in this study. First, we use the CME's Computerized Trade
Reconstruction (CTR) data for two years, June 22, 1986 to June 21, 1988 with the inception of
the Top- Step Rule falling in the middle of the sample period. This file contains, for each trade,
the customer type, trade type, the number of contracts traded and prices but dated only by the
half-hour. The customer type is classified as four indicators with respect to the floor brokers or
floor traders according to Regulation 1.35 of the Commodity Exchange Act. CTI 1 refers to
brokers trading for their own account; CTI 2 to brokers trading for their clearing members'
house account; CTI 3 to trading for another member present on the exchange floor or an account
controlled by such other members; and CTI 4 for trading for any other type of customers.
Second, we use the CME's time and sales data which contain the time and price of each
S&P futures transaction. This data base includes only transactions with price changes as reported
for futures contracts and the value of the spot index. Finally, to construct theoretical futures
prices, we obtained the S&P 500 stock index quotes, dividend yields from the CRSP tapes and
daily interest rate data for T-bills from the Data Resources Inc.
B. Methodology
First, we construct estimates of the price impact of large futures trades ("market depth")
and second, we estimate the effect of the top-step rule on market depth. Our estimates of market
depth are based upon the methodology used by Vijh (1990) for the CBOE equity options. The
potential price impact of large trades can be either of a permanent or a temporary nature. If
large futures trades are carried out because informed traders have superior information about
future stock prices, then this should lead to a permanent change in both stock and futures prices
surrounding large futures trades. On the other hand, if large futures trades cause additional
inventory carrying costs for market makers, then this should cause a temporary deviation of the
market futures price from its theoretical price. Also, since the magnitude of the deviation
depends upon transactions costs (sum of commission costs in the stock and futures markets plus
market impact costs of putting the trades initially), estimating the deviation would be an indirect
way of measuring the effect on transactions costs.
To estimate market depth, we first identify "large" futures trades and the time brackets
in which they occur. A large trade is defined in the following way. The average volume per
transaction (ATV) is defined as the ratio of total volume to the total number of transactions for
each time bracket7 . For each of the two trade types (buys and sales), a large trade for that type
is defined as a trade (ATV) one standard deviation greater than that trade type's daily mean for
the entire two year sample period.
If large futures trades are motivated by superior information about the underlying stocks,
then stock prices surrounding the large futures trade should be permanently affected. Denote the
half-hour time bracket in which the j-th large futures trade occurs as the j-th interval. Let Soj be
the spot price (midpoint of the last quote) of the S&P 500 stock index just before the beginning
of the j-th interval. Then r
t ,
the average spot price relative to S
oj , is:
7The reason we construct a measure of average volume instead of just working with the raw
volume variable is that, since trades are only dated by the half-hour, when more than one trade
occurs within a half-hour bracket these cannot be time-ordered. In contrast, there is just one
value of ATV per half-hour bracket.
r, = Ej=?(S g/nS oj) (1)
where n is the number of large futures trades and Sg is the stock price t minutes from the
beginning of the j-th interval. For each t, rt should be equal to 1 (ignoring a small return for a
few minutes) if large futures trades were not information-based, r, should increase (decrease)
with t if traders have information that the spot index will increase (decrease) 8 .
r
t
is calculated for values of t ranging from 15 minutes before to 15 minutes after the
beginning of the j-th interval. For example, suppose only two large trades occur in the sample
(n=2), one in the 10-10.30 AM bracket and the other in the 3-3.30 PM bracket. If we set t=-15
minutes, then r. I5 is calculated by first taking the ratios of the spot prices at 9.45 AM and 2.45
PM to the spot prices just before 10 AM and 3 PM, respectively, and then averaging the two
ratios. r
t
is calculated for time periods before the j-th interval in this way to reflect the
possibility that the market may learn about a large trade before it actually occurs.
If a large futures trade is information based, it may also have a permanent effect on the
surrounding futures prices. This effect is estimated by the statistic f
t
which measures the average
futures price relative to F
oj , the market futures price just before the j-th interval. ft is defined in
identical fashion to r
t ,
with the futures prices replacing the spot prices.
A large futures trade may also cause a temporary divergence between the market futures
price and its theoretical price if it increases market makers' inventory carrying costs. To estimate
8A potential problem with this test is that we do not know exactly when the j-th trade occurs
within the half-hour bracket. This is because of the way the CTR data is constructed. If it occurs
towards the end of the j-th interval, then S
oj will be a stale price. So we repeat the test, but
calculate the average spot price relative to S
cj , the spot index price just after the j-th interval.
The second reference point S
cj is meant to capture the information effect of large trades
occurring towards the end of the j-th interval.
this "inventory" effect for a futures contract expiring at time T, define the "mispricing" variable
xgT as follows
9
:
xgT = [FgT - S^^/Spj (2)
where F^T is the market price of the futures contract t minutes from the beginning of the j-th
interval, Sg is the index value, and r and d represent the risk-free rate and the dividend rate,
respectively. We choose stock index quotes 30 minutes apart (the limits chosen to coincide with
those of the half-hour brackets in the CTR data) so that the mispricing variable is defined for
half-hour intervals. Averaging over all large trades:
mtT = Sj=?(Vn) 0)
where n is the number of large futures trades.
After measuring the liquidity of the S&P 500 futures market, we test whether the top-step
rule has a significant impact on the liquidity. Following Fishman and Longstaff (1992), dual
trading volume is identified with member trading volume (customer type indicators or CTI codes
1,2 and 3) and nondual trading volume with public trading volume (CTI code 4)10 . The average
per transaction dual trading volume (ADTV) is proxied by the ratio of member volume to the
number of member transactions for each time bracket. The average non-dual trading volume
(ANTV) is similarly defined. Then, for each of the four trade types (dual buys and sales;
nondual buys and sales), a large trade for that type is defined as a trade (ADTV or ANTV) one
9
In our tests, we only consider nearby contracts, which have the highest trading volumes.
10We have repeated our tests with a narrower definition of dual trades by using trades
identified under CTI code 1 only - as in the CFTC (1989) study. This does not change any of
our results materially. The results will be available upon request from the authors.
10
standard deviation greater than that trade type's daily mean for the entire two year sample
period. The sample period is divided into three sub-periods - period 1 for the pre-rule-change
regime (6/22/86-6/21/87), period 2 for the post-change but pre-crash situation (6/22/87-
10/18/87) and period 3 for the post-crash interval (10/19/87-6/21/88). To test the significance
of changes in market depth, if any, among the three sample periods, we run the dummy
regressions for both r
t
and mtT . For example, for mtT , we estimate the following equation:
mtT = ot + aA, + a2D,2 + e, (4)
where Du = 1 for sample two (post rule change and pre-crash) and zero otherwise and Da = 1
for sample three (post-crash) and otherwise. Under the null hypothesis, a, and a2 are zero.
If a, is significantly less (greater) than zero, then depth is higher (lower) in the dual trading
regime.
In addition to testing the price impact of large futures trades, we also estimate their effect
on price volatility. Using the high-low spread as a measure of price volatility, we perform two
tests: first, we count the number of occurrences for which the j-th interval's high-low spread is
increased or decreased relative to the previous day's median spread. This allows us to examine
whether high volume days are generally associated with increased price volatility. Second, we
compute the statistic pt , defined as:
pt = E^Pg-pySoj (5)
where Pg is the high-low spread t half-hour intervals (i.e. 30t minutes) from the j-th interval and
li
p is the average high-low spread computed over the previous 8 days 11 . The difference between
these two variables is normalized by Sqj, the spot price just before the beginning of the j-th
interval, and then averaged across all large trades. If the volatility is unaffected by large trades,
then pt=0 for each t.
Although trading volume and volatility may be positively correlated in general, Fishman
and Longstaff (1992) claim that dual (nondual) trading volume and volatility are negatively
(positively) correlated. To check this claim, the above two tests are repeated for both dual and
nondual large trades and for each of the three sample periods 12
.
Finally, we test Grossman's (1989) conjecture that dual trading creates a reserve pool of
brokers who can switch to servicing customers in high volume periods. Define the broker
participation rate for the i-th time bracket, BPI^, as:
BPRj = number of member transactions in the i-th interval ,
total number of member and non member transactions
We interpret this ratio as a proxy for the number of active dual trading brokers in the relevant
time bracket. If dual trading has no effect on brokers' participation rate, then BPP^ should be
constant over time for each i. Otherwise, the ratio should be positively correlated with the
relative dual trading volume (i.e. the ratio of dual trading volume to total volume in the i-th
interval).
n 8 days is used to account for the bunching of large trades over consecutive days (see
section V.B for a more detailed discussion of this bunching phenomena). Since the number of
such consecutive large volume days never exceeds 9, we expect this average to be representative
of a typical day.
12One advantage of equation (5) is that it can take account of possible bunching effects of
large futures trades as shown in section V.D.
12
IV. Liquidity of the S&P 500 Futures Market.
Table 1 reports the effects of large futures trades on the surrounding spot prices, based
on the assumption that the large trades occur towards the beginning of the half-hour brackets 13 .
The surrounding spot prices appear to be unaffected, with rt being very close to one for all
values of t for both buyer and seller initiated trades. This indicates that, within a 30 minute span
around the occurrence of the large futures trades, the underlying spot prices remain virtually
unchanged on average. Further, r
t
does not increase or decrease with t, indicating that the large
futures trades are not motivated by superior information. This is not surprising, since the
underlying asset is not an individual stock but the S&P 500 index and thus, to obtain profitable
trading opportunities, investors would need to have privileged access to market-related
information. These results are consistent with the effect of large options trades on surrounding
stock prices, as reported in Vijh (1990) 14 .
Table 2 shows that, for large futures trades, the market price is consistently below its
true theoretical price. The reason may be that it is easier (because of short-selling restrictions
in the spot market) to sell futures and hold a long position in the S&P 500 index, rather than buy
futures and go short in the index. Thus, whenever futures are over-priced, arbitragers can
correct this but the reverse is not equally feasible15 .
Consistent with previous studies, Table 3 shows that volume and volatility are, in
13The qualitative results do not change if the tests are repeated with the large futures trades
assumed to occur towards the end of the half-hour brackets.
14We have also tested, but not reported, the effect of large futures trades on the surrounding
futures prices. The results are similar to those reported in the paper regarding the spot prices.
They will be available upon request from the authors.
15We are indebted to Jay Ritter for suggesting this explanation.
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general, positively correlated - large futures trades cause an increase in the high-low spread
relative to its average over the previous eight days. If the large trade occurs in the j-th interval,
then the spread starts to increase from at least interval j-2 (one hour before), peaks in interval
j-1 (half-hour before) and then returns to its average level by interval j +2 (one hour after). At
the five percent level, the increase is significant in interval j-2 for large sales and in interval j-1
for both large purchases and sales.
Summarizing, our results show that the S&P 500 index futures market has great depth
in its capacity to absorb large trades without a significant price impact and without causing a
serious misalignment in futures prices from their true underlying values. Large futures trades
do, however, cause higher price volatility as measured by the high-low spread.
V. The Effect of Dual Trading on Liquidity In The S&P 500 Futures Market.
A. Transactions, Trading Volumes and Broker Participation Rates.
Tables 4-6 contain some summary statistics on the mean dual trading and nondual trading
volume (DTV and NTV), number of transactions (DTT and NTT) and the average volume per
transaction (ADT and ANT) for each half-hour time bracket and each time period. Both the
number of transactions and the trading volume for all three periods are high around opening
time, decrease until noon and rise again until the market closes, so that the familiar U-shaped
pattern emerges. This is consistent with previous studies (eg. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988),
Wood, Mclnish and Ord (1985) and Park (1992)). Note also that the average volume per
transaction is U-shaped as well, which implies that relative to the number of transactions, the
dollar volume is more concentrated around the opening and closing times. Figures 1-6 illustrate.
14
The letters on the horizontal axis refer to the time brackets following the conventions of the CTR
data. For example, a is the 8-8.30 AM bracket, b is the 8.30-9 AM bracket and so on.
Table 7 shows how the sample means of these variables differ across the three regimes.
The rule change reduces the sample mean of DTV by about 6.61%, which is significant at the
five percent level 16 . This number is somewhat consistent with the estimate in the CFTC (1989)
study of a reduction in DTV by 7.4%-12% if dual trading were completely eliminated (which
is not the case here) 17 . The time bracket most affected by the rule change is the 3-3.30 PM
interval where DTV drops by 11.78%. The crash reduces DTV by a further 40.95%. On the
other hand, NTV is hardly affected by the rule change (0.8% reduction) whereas the crash
causes a drop of 35.58%. The reduction in the sample mean of DTT due to the rule change and
the crash are 7.77% (significant at the 2.5% level) and 32.2%, respectively. The corresponding
numbers for NTT are 3.15% and 42.56%. Again, the 3-3.30 PM time interval suffers the most
with a DTT reduction of about 11.94%.
Given that the rule change reduces total dual trading volume and transactions
proportionately, it follows that the average per transaction dual trading volume ADT is relatively
unchanged over the first two periods (a change of +0.87%). In fact, it is of roughly the same
order as the change in ANT (+0.54%). The effect of the crash is more interesting. Whereas
16To test whether the changes in the mean among different sample periods are statistically
significant, the daily averages were regressed on two dummies to isolate the effects of the rule
change and the crash. Table 8 provides the regression results. The coefficient of the crash
dummy is highly significant for all the variables whereas the coefficient of the rule change
dummy is never significant for any of the non-dual trading variables. The rule change dummy
coefficient is significant for DTT and marginally significant for DTV.
17This shows that our definition of dual trading, though somewhat rough compared to that
of the CFTC, still provides a reasonable basis for our study.
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ADT is reduced by 6.03%, ANT actually increases by 20.32%. The reason is that total public
volume is decreased but the shrinkage in the number of public trading transactions is far larger.
Dual trading may enhance market depth by increasing broker participation in high volume
periods. With this in mind, we calculate for each half-hour interval i the Pearson and Spearman
rank correlation coefficients between the broker participation rate BPRj and the ratio of dual
trading volume to total trading volume. The correlation coefficients should be positive by
hypothesis. The results reported in Table 9 show that the coefficients are positive and highly
significant for each time bracket, ranging from 0.71 to 0.86 in the pre-rule change period, from
0.67 to 0.94 in the post-change pre-crash period and from 0.76 to 0.94 in the post-crash period.
The stability of the correlations over the three sample periods suggests that the reduction in dual
trading activity is not sufficient to diminish the provision of liquidity services to brokerage
customers.
B. Information Effect of Dual Trading on Market Depth.
Figures 7-12 plot the frequency distribution of large dual and nondual trades over
different time brackets for each day and over different trading periods. Large dual trades appear
to have a pronounced U-shaped pattern. Large nondual trades exhibit a wave pattern with trading
concentrated around the opening and early afternoon times, but tapering off towards the end.
More importantly, large trades of both types are bunched together over successive days,
interspersed with relatively quiet days in-between 18 . This result is consistent with the prediction
of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) that informed traders bunch with noise traders in order to hide
l8See section V.D below as to why this is important for our tests.
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their information. Although Admati and Pfleiderer are, in their paper, primarily concerned with
intra-day trade variation, their argument applies equally well to the inter-day variation in trades
as well 19 .
The spot prices during a 30 minute interval around the occurrence of large dual and non-
dual futures trades do not appear to be affected (see Tables 10 and ll)20 . For example, for the
first sample period, r
t
is 0.99988 for buyer-initiated and 1.00014 for seller-initiated dual trading
at t=-5, i.e. 5 minutes before the beginning of the time bracket in which the large dual trade
occurs. Further, within each sample period, r
t
does not increase or decrease with t. Comparing
between samples one and two, the rule change does not appear to have affected the behavior of
the surrounding stock prices21 . Nor do there appear to be any distinction between large dual
and nondual trades in this respect.
In Tables 12-13, we report the effect of large futures trades on the surrounding futures
prices. The results are very similar to the ones reported above for the spot prices. The
surrounding futures prices are largely unaffected by large dual and nondual trades. A comparison
of the mispricing variable across the three regimes show very little variation, with the t-statistics
19
It also appears that before the crash, large dual trades were more frequent than large
nondual trades. After the crash, on the other hand, large nondual trades became twice as
frequent as large dual trades. We can provide no explanation for this pattern. Certainly, it
deserves further study.
20 Although these calculations are based on the assumption that the j-th large futures trade
occurs towards the beginning of the j-th interval, the qualitative results do not change if they
occur towards the end of the interval. These latter results are not reported but are available upon
request from the authors.
2IRegressing r, on two time dummies show that for r+5 , r +10 and r +15 , the crash coefficients
are significant for both large dual purchases and sales. For purchases, the corresponding t-values
are -2.671, -2.712 and -2.627, respectively, whereas for sales they are all greater than 4 in
absolute value. None of the coefficients of the dual trading dummies are statistically significant.
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on the time dummies being uniformly insignificant22 .
C. Inventory Effect of Dual Trading on Market Depth.
Consistent with our previous findings, large dual and nondual trades are priced
systematically below their theoretical prices (see Tables 14 and 15). The magnitude of mispricing
is significant in most cases except seller initiated dual trades for the first and second periods and
buyer initiated non-dual trades in the second period. However, the regression results (not
reported here to conserve space) show that, for both large dual buys and sales, the amount of
mispricing is not affected by the top-step rule but is increased significantly by the crash.
Therefore, it does not appear that the rule change imposed any further inventory carrying costs
on market makers.
D. Effect of Dual Trading on Price Volatility.
Tables 16-17 show how the high-low spread changes relative to the previous day's
median when a large futures trade occurs. According to Fishman and Longstaff (1992), spreads
associated with large dual trades (both buys and sales) should increase after the inception of the
top-step rule. The results are mixed, however. For large dual purchases, the rule change actually
reduces by about 10% the number of trades for which the spread is increased and increases by
about 7% the number for which the spread is decreased from the previous day's median. For
large dual and nondual sales, exactly the opposite result is obtained.
22The only exception is that, for large dual sales, the crash increases s., 5 which has a positive
dummy coefficient with a t value of +2.055.
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The crash has very little effect on the high-low spread of large buys (dual and nondual).
Surprisingly, the crash reduces the percentage of large sales (dual and nondual) for which the
spread is increased. If the high-low spread is a measure of price volatility, this result flies
against conventional wisdom. One explanation relies on our earlier observation that the bunching
of large volume days increased after the crash (see Figures 8-9 and 1 1-12). The previous day's
median spread, therefore, is likely to be larger on average after the crash. Of course, a typical
large trade is also associated with a larger absolute value of the spread after the crash (see
Tables 16-17). It appears, though, that the bunching effect dominates.
Since the results may be affected by the bunching of large volume trades (which is also
evident before the crash), we perform the test specified in equation (5). Tables 18-19 report the
results. The changes in the high-low spreads are significantly positive for large dual trades but
not for large nondual trades with few exceptions. More importantly, the effect of the rule change
is not significant. These results are not consistent with the predictions of Fishman and Longstaff
(1992). The crash causes the spread to increase significantly for large dual buys and sells23 . It
is interesting, however, to note that large nondual trades are, in general, unaffected by the crash.
VI. Conclusion.
This paper investigates the liquidity of the S&P 500 index futures market and tests
whether the liquidity is affected by the restriction on dual trading activity due to the CME's top-
23The results of dummy regressions for testing the differences among three different time
regimes are available from the authors upon request. Also, when we repeated the tests using the
average spread for the previous day only (instead of the previous 8 days), we found that even
the effect of the crash is insignificant. This lends indirect support to the manner in which we
have defined our statistic.
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step rule. In measuring liquidity, we examine various market characteristics such as depth,
trading volume and transactions, high-low spreads of prices and brokers' participation rate. In
estimating depth, we distinguish between any permanent price effects caused by informationally
motivated large trades and temporary mispricings due to the impact of large trades on market
makers' inventory carrying costs.
Our results show that the S&P 500 index futures market is an extremely liquid market.
It has great depth in its capacity to absorb large trades without a significant price impact. Large
futures trades do, however, cause higher price volatility as measured by the high-low spread.
The restriction on dual trading (through the CME's top-step rule) caused some reduction
in both the dual trading volume and the number of transactions while leaving the average order
size per transaction unchanged. However, this reduction in dual trading activity does not appear
to have significantly affected the liquidity of the S&P 500 index futures market. The behavior
of stock and futures prices surrounding large futures trades show no significant impact from the
top-step rule. Similarly, while there exists significant underpricing of the index futures, we can
find no additional mispricing due to the rule change. Our results on the liquidity effects of dual
trading are not consistent with some previous studies (in particular, Smith and Whaley (1990b))
which did find an adverse impact on the bid-ask spread due to the restriction on dual trading.
Our results also contradict the findings of Fishman and Longstaff (1992) that dual trading and
price volatility are negatively related. When we compare the high-low spread associated with a
large trade with the previous day's median spread, the hypothesized relation holds for large dual
sales but not for purchases. When compared to the average spread, however, no significant
relationship is found between volatility and dual trading activity.
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We do find that the participation of dual trading brokers is positively correlated with high
volume trading intervals. However, the advent of the top-step rule again in no way diminishes
the role of dual trading brokers in providing customers with liquidity services.
Not surprisingly, the market crash has significant effects on all characteristics of the
market examined in this paper. Since the focus of the paper is on dual trading, we do not
provide a detailed examination of market characteristics around the crash. However, the issue
certainly deserves further study in the future.
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TABLE 1
Stock Prices Surrounding Large Futures Trades
The change in stock prices for the 30 minute window surrounding large futures
trades (defined as the sample mean of ATV plus one standard deviation) . The stock
price reaction is measured by r, = ZjSg/nSoj, where S
tj is the stock price t minutes
from the beginning of the time bracket when the j-th large trade occurs and n is
the number of large trades. Buy and Sell indicate large purchases and sales.
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
-15 -10 + 5 + 10 + 15
Buy 1.00025
(.00055)
N=279
0.99991
( .00048)
N=279
0.99955
(.00043)
N=279
0.99762
(.00067)
N=274
0.99753
(.0007)
N=274
0.99762
(.00081)
N=274
Sell 0.99986
(.00038)
N=457
0.99975
(.00034)
N=457
0.99959
(.0003)
N=457
0.99869
(.00049)
N=4 48
0.99863
(.00051)
N=448
0.99876
( .00038)
N=448
TABLE 2
Mispricing In Futures Prices Surrounding Large Futures Trades
The mispricing variable for the j-th large trade is measured by x,jT = [F ljT - S,je (r"
d)<T
"°
] / Sqj , where F,jT is the market futures price of an index expiring at time T and
S,: is the index value. The averaging mispricing is given by m,T = Sj=°x lT/n, where
n is the number of large trades, t takes on values within the 30 minute window
surrounding large trades (defined as the sample mean of ATV plus one standard
deviation). Buy and Sell indicate large purchases and sales. Standard errors are
reported in parenthesis. N indicates the number of observations.
r.15 r.io r.s r r +5 r + io r+,5
Buy- -.0099
(.002)
N=279
-.0097
( .002)
N=279
-.0099
(.002)
N=279
-.01
( .002)
N=279
-.0086
( .002)
N=274
-.0097
(.002)
N=274
-.0091
( .002)
N=274
Sell -.006
(.001)
N=4 2 5
-.0063
(.001)
N=4 2 5
-.0062
(.001)
N=4 2 5
-.0062
(.001)
N=4 2 5
-.0056
(.001)
N=416
-.0061
(.001)
N=416
-.0057
(.001)
N=416
TABLE 3
High-low Spread Relative To Average For Large Futures Trades
The high-low price spread Pj for the j-th large trade is compared to its average
over the previous 8 days. The reported statistic is p,mEj.|[ pg - P]/Soj, where P tj is
the high-low price spread t intervals from the interval in which j-th large
futures trade occurred and S^ is the index value at t=0. n is the number of large
trades, t takes on values from -2 to +2, i.e. two half-hour time intervals before
and after the j-th interval. Buy and Sell indicate large purchases and sales.
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. N indicates the number of
observations
.
P-2 P-i Po P+l P + 2
Buy- 0.00229
(.0012)
N=210
0.00249
(.001)
N=257
0.0012
(.00092)
N=257
0.0
(.0009)
N=250
0.00061
(.0009)
N=253
Sell 0.00175
(.00079)
N=338
0.00196
(.00064)
N=4 2 2
0.00062
(.00059)
N=422
0.0
(.00059)
N=409
0.00048
(.0006)
N=413
TABLE 4
DUAL TRADING AND NON-DUAL TRADING TRANSACTIONS
The daily mean of the number of dual trading (DTT) and non-dual trading (NTT)
transactions for each half-hour time interval for each of three sample periods. Sample
period 1 is the pre-rule change period, 2 is the post-change but pre-crash period and
3 is the post-change post-crash period. N gives the total number of observations for
each sample period. The 12-12. 30PM interval is omitted as it contains minimal trading
activity.
DTT1 DTT
2
DTT
3
(N=248) (N=83) (N=172)
NTT1 NTT
2
NTT
3
(N=248) (N=83) (N=172)
9-9. 30AM 3588.63 3473.75 2272.89 1771.82 1783.23 912.87
9.30-10AM 2857.65 2589.65 1684.83 1337.94 1162.14 640.79
10-10. 30AM 2152.65 2089.07 1297.16 991.27 964.37 511.29
10.30-11AM 1848.38 1718.05 1081.95 895.99 858.42 482.90
11-11. 30AM 1717.04 1562.51 985.34 829.78 795.46 445.06
11.30-12PM 1471.22 1351.25 841.16 725.70 709.04 391.27
12.30-1PM 1445.05 1322.96 880.81 703.67 664.41 398. 19
1-1. 30PM 1610.88 1475.51 986.00 761.37 712.58 430.28
1.30-2PM 1764.05 1644.53 1137.33 817.20 780.58 467.33
2-2. 30PM 1846.57 1710.81 1272.33 852.25 822.10 538.81
2.30-3PM 1974.99 1738.10 1314.77 964.08 916.74 571.09
3-3. 30PM 2034.63 1791.66 1383.43 1052.56 1025.02 655.36
3.30-4PM 1884.67 1713.87 1282.36 1012.11 1062.23 633.40
4-4. 30PM 1005.93 909.46 591.32 807.10 840.53 443.56
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TABLE 5
DUAL TRADING AND NON-DUAL TRADING VOLUMES
The daily mean of the number of dual trading (DTV) and non-dual trading (NTV) volumes
for each half-hour time interval for each of three sample periods. Sample period 1 is
±he pre-rule change period, 2 is the post-change but pre-crash period and 3 is the
post-change post-crash period. N gives the total number of observations for each sample
period. The 12-12. 30PM interval is omitted as it contains minimal trading activity.
DTVl
(N=248)
DTV2
(N=83)
DTV3
(N=172)
NTV1
(N=248)
NTV2
(N=83)
NTV3
(N=172)
9-9. 30AM 13171.54 13036.89 7436.24 6948.48 7532.17 4485.69
9.30-10AM 9775.86 8746.53 4987.23 5099.42 4600.90 2877.74
10-10. 30AM 7054.74 7012.78 3788.24 3636.64 3611.13 2200.24
10.30-11AM 6070.87 5746.00 3172.05 3242.55 3622.43 2083.05
11-11. 30AM 5663.22 5122.07 2816.64 3003.08 2895.66 1952.15
11.30-12PM 4749.28 4528.92 2361.97 2640.94 2586.80 1550.92
12.30-1PM 4731.30 4262.66 2540.77 2516.40 2282.46 1623.87
1-1. 30PM 5216.75 4772.45 2747.92 2718.84 2500.16 1754.18
1.30-2PM 5707.04 5460.07 3279.83 2852.29 2824.72 1912.97
2-2. 30PM 5943.49 5677.04 3676.92 2985.79 2895.35 2162.40
2.30-3PM 6562.96 5937.81 3851.55 3344.67 3286.63 2148.89
3-3. 30PM 7023.44 6196.37 4182.82 3735.00 3658.95 2469.08
3.30-4PM 6854.40 6323.89 4126.56 3826.66 4103. 17 2599.41
4-4. 30PM 4089.98 3668.08 2107.78 3034.67 3183.51 1870.25
l>
27
TABLE 6
AVERAGE DUAL TRADING AND NON-DUAL TRADING VOLUMES
The daily mean of the (per transaction) average dual trading (ADT) and non-dual trading
(ANT) volumes (defined as DTV/DTT and NTV/NTT, respectively) for each half-hour time
interval for each of three sample periods. Sample period 1 is the pre-rule change
period, 2 is the post-change but pre-crash period and 3 is the post-change post-crash
period. N gives the total number of observations for each sample period. The 12-12. 30PM
interval is omitted as it contains minimal trading activity.
ADT1
(N=248)
ADT2
(N=83)
ADT 3
(N=172)
ANT1
(N=248)
ANT2
(N=83)
ANT 3
(N=172)
9-9. 30AM 3.69 3.80 3.42 3.90 4.25 4.95
9.30-10AM 3.47 3.38 3.26 3.85 3.98 4.79
10-10. 30AM 3.24 3.28 3.09 3.61 3.71 4.33
10.30-11AM 3.27 3.19 2.99 3.57 3.86 4.34
11-11. 30AM 3.23 3.11 2.99 3.77 3.98 4.53
11.30-12PM 3.19 3.41 2.88 3.55 3.59 4.00
12.30-1PM 3.24 3.20 3.14 3.56 3.34 4.28
1-1. 30PM 3.16 3.16 2.90 3.50 3.52 4.31
1.30-2PM 3.16 3.30 2.95 3.52 3.43 4.10
2-2. 30PM 3.24 3.18 3.22 3.54 3.45 4.35
2.30-3PM 3.37 3.37 3.00 3.49 3.46 4.12
3-3. 30PM 3.44 3.26 3.33 3.54 3.39 3.90
3.30-4PM 3.57 3.46 3.17 3.74 3.65 3.98
4-4. 30PM 4.01 3.94 3.53 3.69 3.75 4.20
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TABLE 7
SAMPLE MEANS FOR TRANSACTIONS AND TRADING VOLUMES
The sample means for trading volume (DTV and NTV), number of transactions (DTT and
NTT), and average volume per transaction (ADT and ANT) for each of three sample
^periods. Sample period 1 is the pre-rule change period, 2 is the post-change but pre-
jcrash period and 3 is the post-change post-crash period. N gives the total number of
observations for each sample period.
Periodl
(N=248)
Period2
(N=83)
Period3
(N=172)
DTV 92614.92 86491.57 51076.52
NTV 49585.36 49188.06 31690.84
DTT 27202.35 25091.17 17011.68
NTT 13522.85 13096.86 7522.20
ADT 3.4478 3.4791 3.2668
ANT 3.7188 3.7436 4.5014
TABLE 8
ESTIMATES FOR DUMMY VARIABLE COEFFICIENTS
The coefficient estimates for the regression Xj^aj+biDn+c.D,,, for i=l through 6. X,=DTV,
X2=NTV, X 3=DTT, X„=NTT, X 5=ADT and X6=NDT. D,=l in period 2 and otherwise, Da=l in
period 3 and otherwise. Sample period 1 is the pre-rule change period, 2 is the post-
change but pre-crash period and 3 is the post-change post-crash period. N gives the
total number of observations for each sample period. T values are in parenthesis.
)
(N=502) (N=502) (N=502)
DTV -6123.35
(-1.669)
-41538.40
(-14.466)
92614.92
(50.403)
NTV 397.30
(-0.163)
-17894.52
(-9.373)
49585.36
(40.585)
DTT -2111.18
(-2.094)
-10190.67
(-12.916)
27202.35
(53.877)
NTT -425.995
(-0.817)
-6000.65
(-14.699)
13522.85
(51.764)
ADT -0.034
(-0.62)
-0.122
(-2.851)
2.276
(83.273)
ANT 0.095
(1.017)
0.252
(3.453)
1.263
(27.095)
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TABLE 9
BROKER PARTICIPATION RATE
The Pearson (P
s
) and the Spearman (S;) rank correlation coeffcients for sample period
i between the relative number of dual trading transactions BPR and the relative dual
trading volume RDT for each time interval. Sample period 1 is the pre-rule change
period, 2 is the post-change but pre-crash period and 3 is the post-change post-crash
period. BPR is defined as DTT/ (DTT+NTT) and RDT is defined as DTV/ (DTV+NTV) . N gives
the total number of observations for each sample period. The 12-12. 30PM interval is
omitted as it contains minimal trading activity.
SI
(N=248)
S2
(N=83)
S3
(N=172)
PI
(N=248)
P2
(N=83)
P3
(N=172)
9-9. 30AM 0.8504 0.8734 0.8634 0.8371 0.8429 0.8551
9.30-10AM 0.7744 0.9215 0.8431 0.7760 0.8694 0.7580
10-10. 30AM 0.7106 0.9229 0.8633 0.7356 0.8762 0.7195
10.30-11AM 0.7261 0.7525 0.8165 0.7797 0.8354 0.7861
11-11. 30AM 0.8176 0.9453 0.8507 0.7669 0.8389 0.7857
11.30-12PM 0.7914 0.8148 0.7703 0.7781 0.8069 0.7678
12.30-1PM 0.8234 0.8967 0.8167 0.8283 0.8377 0.7998
1-1. 30PM 0.7839 0.8534 0.8832 0.7406 0.8319 0.7425
1.30-2PM 0.8534 0.7790 0.8729 0.8253 0.7571 0.8228
2-2. 30PM 0.7994 0.7681 0.8613 0.7594 0.7700 0.8143
2.30-3PM 0.8611 0.8992 0.8545 0.8139 0.8730 0.7547
3-3. 30PM 0.8027 0.8202 0.9178 0.8100 0.7921 0.8078
3.30-4PM 0.8294 0.9198 0.9461 0.7933 0.8819 0.7541
4-4. 30PM 0.7454 0.6666 0.8487 0.7458 0.7078 0.7422
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TABLE 10
Stock Prices Surrounding Large Dual Trades
The change in stock prices for the 30 minute window surrounding large dual trades
.(defined as the sample mean of ADTV plus one standard deviation) for each sample
period. The stock price reaction is measured by r, = EjS.j/nSoj, where S
g
is the stock
price t minutes from the beginning of the time bracket when the j-th large dual trade
occurs and n is the number of large dual trades. Buy'i' and Sell'i' indicate large dual
purchases and sales for sample period i. Sample period 1 is the pre-rule change period,
2 is the post-change but pre-crash period and 3 is the post-change post-crash period.
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Buyl Buy2 Buy3 Selll Sell2 Sell3
r.i5 1.00041
(.00033)
N=155
0.99953
(.00060)
N=52
1.00033
(.00104)
N=131
1.00020
(.00020)
N=303
0.99973
(.00037)
N=103
1.00005
(.00076)
N=192
r.io 1.00003
(.00029)
N=155
0.99930
(.00054)
N=52
1.00001
( .00092)
N=131
1.00015
(.00018)
N=303
0.99974
(.00033)
N=103
0.99993
(.00067)
N=192
r 5 0.99988
(.00022)
N=155
0.99932
(.00048)
N=52
0.99946
(.00084)
N=131
1.00014
(.00015)
N=303
0.99984
( .00028)
N=103
0.99949
( .0006)
N=192
r 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
r +5 0.99922
(.00039)
N=150
0.99828
(.00077)
N=4 9
0.99603
(.00130)
N=126
1.00020
(.00024)
N=295
0.99970
(.00043)
N=101
0.99707
(.00095)
N=189
r +io 0.99920
(.00043)
N=150
0.99809
(.00082)
N=4 9
0.99582
(.00135)
N=126
1.00020
(.00025)
N=2 9 5
0.99960
(.00045)
N=101
0.99689
(.00098)
J*=189
r + is 0.99918
(.00047)
N=150
0.99800
(.00089)
N=4 9
0.99573
(.00141)
N=126
1.00024
(.00027)
N=2 9 5
0.99968
(.00047)
N=101
0.99670
(.00103)
N=189
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TABLE 11
Stock Prices Surrounding Large Non-dual Trades
The change in stock prices for the 30 minute window surrounding large non-dual trades
(defined as the sample mean of ANTV plus one standard deviation) for each sample
period. The stock price reaction is measured by r, = SjS,j/nSpj, where S
tj is the stock
price t minutes from the beginning of the time bracket when the j-th large non-dual
trade occurs and n is the number of large non-dual trades. Buy'i' and Sell'i' indicate
large nondual purchases and sales for sample period i. Sample period 1 is the pre-rule
change period, 2 is the post-change but pre-crash period and 3 is the post-change post-
crash period. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Buyl Buy2 Buy 3 Selll Sell2 Sell3
r.is 1.00050
(.00045)
N=8
1.00115
(.00050)
N=2 6
0.99981
(.00061)
N=270
0.99975
(.00032)
N=157
1.00003
(.00038)
N=67
0.99991
(.00053)
N=3 08
r.io 1.00035
(.00045)
N=80
1.00087
( .00049)
N=2 6
0.99964
(.00054)
N=270
0.99968
( .00028)
N=157
0.99996
(.00029)
N=67
0.99984
(.00047)
N=308
r.s 1.00018
(.00041)
N=8
1.00038
(.00037)
N=2 6
0.99929
(.00049)
N=270
0.99964
(.00024)
N=157
0.99989
(.00020)
N=67
0.99958
(.00043)
N=308
r 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
r +5 1.00047
(.00045)
N=8
0.99973
(.00085)
N=2 6
0.99831
(.00079)
N=269
0.99961
(.00036)
N=154
0.99924
(.00054)
N=67
0.99877
(.00073)
N=306
r +io 1.00027
(.00049)
N=8
0.99959
(.00101)
N=26
0.99829
( .00082)
N=269
0.99946
(.00039)
N=154
0.99907
(.00059)
N=67
0.99868
(.00075)
_N=306
r + i 5 0.99987
(.00061)
N=8
0.99931
(.00115)
N=2 6
0.99864
(.00092)
N=269
0.99947
(.00042)
N=154
0.99890
(.00061)
N=67
0.99904
(.00084)
N=306
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TABLE 12
Futures Prices Surrounding Large Dual Trades
The change in futures prices for the 30 minute window surrounding large dual trades
\(defined as the sample mean of ADTV plus one standard deviation) for each sample
period. The futures price reaction is measured by f, = ZjF.j/nFoj, where F
tj is the futures
price t minutes from the beginning of the time bracket when the j-th large dual trade
occurs and n is the number of large dual trades. Buy'i' and Sell'i' indicate large dual
purchases and sales for sample period i. Sample period 1 is the pre-rule change period,
2 is the post-change but pre-crash period and 3 is the post-change post-crash period.
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Buyl Buy2 Buy3 Selll Sell2 Sell3
f-15 1.00045
(.00035)
N=155
0.99988
(.00052)
N=52
1.00219
(.00142)
N=131
1.00015
(.00020)
N=303
0.99988
(.00032)
N=103
1.00172
(.00099)
N=192
f-.o 1.00050
(.00023)
N=155
0.99971
( .00046)
N=52
1.00162
(.00129)
N=131
1.00019
(.00013)
N=303
0.99988
(.00025)
N=103
1.00137
(.00091)
N=192
f-5 1.00016
(.00018)
N=155
1.00021
(.00027)
N=52
1.00094
(.00081)
N=131
1.00001
(.00010)
N=303
1.00020
(.00016)
N=103
1.00068
(.00061)
N=192
fo 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
f+5 0.99978
(.00040)
N=150
0.99891
(.0007)
N=49
1.00071
(.00352)
N=126
1.00011
(.00023)
N=2 9 5
0.99987
(.00039)
N=101
1.00033
(.00240)
N=189
f + 10 0.99946
(.00043)
N=150
0.99850
(.00115)
N=4 9
0.99905
(.00377)
N=126
1.00011
( .00024)
N=29 5
0.99983
(.00046)
N=101
0.99898
(.00255)
N=189
f + 15 0.99974
(.00056)
N=150
0.99850
(.00027)
N=49
1.00166
(.00482)
N=126
1.00015
( .00031)
N=295
1.00022
(.00054)
N=101
1.00084
(.00324)
N=189
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TABLE 13
Futures Prices Surrounding Large Non-dual Trades
The change in futures prices for the 30 minute window surrounding large non-dual trades
(defined as the sample mean of ANTV plus one standard deviation) for each sample
period. The stock price reaction is measured by f, = SjF.j/nFoj, where F is the futures
price t minutes from the beginning of the time bracket when the j-th large non-dual
trade occurs and n is the number of large non-dual trades. Buy'i' and Sell'i' indicate
large nondual purchases and sales for sample period i. Sample period 1 is the pre-rule
change period, 2 is the post-change but pre-crash period and 3 is the post-change post-
crash period. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Buyl Buy 2 Buy 3 Selll Sell2 Sell3
f-15 1.00016
(.00030)
N=78
1.00157
(.00061)
N=2 5
1.00110
(.00074)
N=261
1.00008
(.00027)
N=146
1.00013
(.00038)
N=65
1.00086
(.00067)
N=290
f-io 1.00000
(.00025)
N=78
1.00095
(.00040)
N=2 5
1.00085
(.00069)
N=261
1.00011
(.00021)
N=146
1.00000
(.00028)
N=65
1.00095
( .00062)
N=290
f-5 1.00000
(.00012)
N=78
1.00027
(.00029)
N=2 5
1.00038
(.00046)
N=261
1.00010
( .00012)
N=146
1.00013
(.00019)
N=65
1.00042
(.00041)
N=290
fo 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
f + 5 1.00009
(.00039)
N=8
0.99946
(.00111)
N=2 6
0.99978
(.00019)
N=269
0.99984
(.00033)
N=154
0.99941
( .00058)
N=67
0.99952
(.00164)
N=306
f + 10 0.99994
(.00046)
N=8
0.99897
(.00143)
N=26
0.99905
(.00195)
N=269
0.99975
(.00034)
N=154
0.99912
(.00069)
N=67
0.99908
(.00174)
_N=306
f + ,5 0.99962
(.00086)
N=8
0.99873
(.00176)
N=2 6
1.00067
(.00240)
N=269
0.99976
(.00043)
N=154
0.99912
(.00079)
N=67
1.00058
(.00213)
N=306
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TABLE 14
Mispricing In Futures Prices Surrounding Large Dual Trades
The mispricing variable for the j-th large trade is measured as x tjT = [F ljT - S^e^*1"-" ] / S„,
,
yhere FljT is the market futures price of an index expiring at time T and S
tj is the index
fcalue. The averaging mispricing is given by m,T = Ej_?x ljT/n, where n is the number of
large trades, t takes on values within the 30 minute window surrounding large dual
trades (defined as the sample mean of ADTV plus one standard deviation). Buy'i' and
Sell'i' indicate large dual purchases and sales for sample period i. Sample period 1
is the pre-rule change period, 2 is the post-change but pre-crash period and 3 is the
post-change post-crash period. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis .N indicates
the number of observations.
Buyl Buy2 Buy3 Selll Sell2 Sell3
m. 15 -.00189
(.00043)
N=154
-.002
(.00066)
N=52
-.01384
( .00337)
N=131
-.00035
(.00033)
N=288
-.00065
(.0005)
N=9 5
-.01180
(.00256)
N=173
m
-io -.00146
(.00038)
N=154
-.00193
(.00064)
N=52
-.01407
( .00340)
N=131
-.00036
(.00032)
N=288
-.00069
( .00052)
N=9 5
-.01236
(.00258)
N=173
m.s -.00166
(.00036)
N=154
-.00146
(.00053)
N=52
-.01406
( .00355)
N=131
-.00046
(.00031)
N=288
-.00046
(.00047)
N=9 5
-.01223
( .00268)
N=173
nto -.00162
(.00049)
N=154
-.00183
(.00062)
N=52
-.01472
(.00341)
N=131
-.00039
(.00031)
N=288
-. 00070
(.0005)
N=95
-.01206
(.00255)
N=173
m+5 -.00138
(.00038)
N=149
-.00168
( .00058)
N=4 9
-.01200
( .00352)
N=126
-.00036
( .00032)
N=280
-.00048
( .0005)
N=9 5
-.01020
(.00256)
N=170
m +io -.00168
(.00037)
N=149
-.00191
( .00065)
N=4 9
-.01363
(.00336)
N=126
-.00034
( .00033)
N=280
-.00037
(.00052)
N=9 5
-.01161
(.00242)
N=170
m +15 -.00135
(.00049)
N=149
-.00172
(.00084)
N=4 9
-.01320
(.00325)
N=126
-.00032
(.00038)
N=280
-.00005
(.00054)
N=95
-.01128
(.00232)
N=170
)
TABLE 15
Mispricing In Futures Prices Surrounding Large Nondual Trades
The mispricing variable for the j-th large futures trade is measured as x ljT = (F,jT - S,je (r"
MM'j/Soj, where FljT is the market futures price of an index expiring at time T and S tj is
the index value. The average mispricing over all large trades is given by m,T = 2j_°x,jT/n,
where n is the number of large trades, t takes on values within the 30 minute window
surrounding large nondual trades (defined as the sample mean of ANTV plus one standard
deviation). Buy'i' and Sell'i' indicate large nondual purchases and sales for sample
period i. Sample period 1 is the pre-rule change period, 2 is the post-change but pre-
crash period and 3 is the post-change post-crash period. Standard errors are reported
in parenthesis. N indicates the number of observations.
Buyl Buy2 Buy3 Selll Sell2 Sell3
m
-15 -.00154
(.00071)
N=7 5
-.00012
(.00153)
N=24
-.00818
(.00189)
N=249
-.00278
(.00036)
N=150
-.00159
(.00063)
N=64
-.00639
(.00175)
N=282
m
-10 -.00158
(.00069)
N=7 5
-.00072
( .00160)
N=2 4
-.00863
(.00190)
N=2 4 9
-.00271
( .00035)
N=150
-.00171
(.00064)
N=64
-.00670
(.00176)
N=282
m.5 -.00135
(.0007)
N=7 5
-.00007
(.00139)
N=2 4
-.00851
(.0020)
N=249
-.00266
( .00034)
N=150
-.00121
(.00057)
N=64
-.00658
(.00182)
N=282
% -.00128
(.0007)
N=7 5
-.00025
(.00146)
N=24
-.00852
(.00188)
N=2 4 9
-.00273
( .00034)
N=150
-.00145
(.00058)
N=64
-.00656
( .00174)
N=282
m +5 -.00158
(.00071)
N=7 5
.00020
(.00136)
N=24
-.00788
( .00190)
N=249
-.00292
( .00035)
N=147
-.00106
(.00057)
N=64
-.00637
(.00178)
N=2 8
m +io -.00153
(.00071)
N=7 5
-.00007
(.00144)
N=2 4
-.00867
(.00186)
N=249
-.00287
(.00035)
N=147
-.00117
(.00059)
N=64
--.00684
(.00171)
N=280
m + 15 -.00136
(.00087)
N=7 5
-.00019
(.00157)
N=24
-.00837
(.00172)
N=249
-.00283
(.00038)
N=147
-.0009
(.00062)
N=64
-.00658
(.00161)
N=2 8
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TABLE 16
CHANGE IN HIGH-LOW SPREAD FOR PURCHASES
The high-low spread for the j-th large buy Pj is compared to the median of the previous
day's high-low spreads. PGDB(PLDB) gives the percentage of times that Pj exceeds (is
oelow) the previous days' median for large dual buys. PEDB gives the percentage times
the spread does not change. PGNDB, PENDB and PLNDB refer to nondual buys. 1 is the pre-
rule change period, 2 is the post-change but pre-crash period and 3 is the post-change
post-crash period. Standard errors are in parenthesis. N gives the total number of
observations for each sample period.
Periodl Period2 Period3
PGDB 64.09 54.55 53.91
(0.04) (0.076) (0.047)
N=142 N=4 4 N=115
PEDB 3.52 0.00 3.48
(0.016) (0.0) (0.017)
N=142 N=44 N=115
PLDB 32.39 45.46 42.61
(0.039) (0.076) (0.046)
N=142 N=4 4 N=115
PGNDB 44.87 48.00 47.89
(0.057) (0.102) (0.031)
N=7 8 N=25 N=261
PENDB 4.95 0.00 5.75
(0.022) (0.00) (0.014)
N=78 N=2 5 N=2 61
PLNDB 51.28 52.00 46.36
(0.057) (0.102) (0.031)
N=7 8 N=2 5 N=261
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TABLE 17
CHANGE IN HIGH-LOW SPREAD FOR SALES
The high-low spread for the j-th large sale Pj is compared to the median of the previous day's
high-low spreads. PGDS(PLDS) gives the percentage of times that Pj exceeds (is below) the
previous days' median for dual sales. PEDS gives the percentage times the spread does not
change. NDS refer to nondual sales. 1 is the pre-rule change period, 2 is the post-change but
pre-crash period and 3 is the post-change post-crash period. Standard errors are in
parenthesis. N gives the total number of observations for each sample period.
Periodl Period2 Periods
PGDS 54.78
(0.03)
N=272
63.83
(0.05)
N=94
48.57
(0.038)
N=175
PEDS 4.04
(0.012)
N=272
2.13
(0.015)
N=94
4.57
(0.016)
N=175
PLDS 41.18
(0.03)
N=272
34.04
(0.049)
N=94
46.86
(0.038)
N=175
PGNDS 45.21
(0.041)
N=146
53.85
(0.062)
N=94
45.86
(0.029)
N=175
PENDS 4.80
(0.018)
N=146
1.54
(0.015)
N=94
4.48
(0.012)
N=175
PLNDS 50.00
(0.042)
N=146
44.62
(0.062)
N=94
49.66
(0.029)
N=175
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ITABLE 18
High-low Spread Relative To Average For Large Dual Trades
The high-low price spread P
}
for the j-th large trade is compared to its average over the
previous 8 days. The reported statistic is Pi=Sj_°[P (j - V]/S 0i , where P tj is the high-low price
spread t intervals from the interval in which j-th large futures trade occurred and S^ is the
index value at t=0. n is the number of large trades, t takes on values from -2 to +2, i.e.
two half-hour time intervals before and after the j-th interval. Buy'i' and Sell'i' indicate
large dual purchases and sales for sample period i. Sample period 1 is the pre-rule change
period, 2 is the post-change but pre-crash period and 3 is the post-change post-crash period.
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. N indicates the number of observations.
Buyl Buy 2 Buy 3 Selll Sell2 Sell3
P-2 0.00289
(.00055)
N=lll
0.00215
( .00069)
N=3 5
0.01029
(.0027)
N=100
0.00209
(.00034)
N=206
0.00157
(.00036)
N=71
0.00656
(.00192)
N=150
P-l 0.00326
( .00046)
N=142
0.00233
(.00056)
N=4 4
0.01083
( .00234)
N=115
0.00208
(.00027)
N=269
0.00189
(.00031)
N=9 4
0.00617
( .00168)
N=175
Po 0.00179
(.00041)
N=142
0.0014
(.00046)
N=4 4
0.00902
( .00215)
N=115
0.00073
(.00023)
N=269
0.00122
(.00038)
N=94
0.00424
( .00155)
N=175
P+l 0.00125
(.00038)
N=141
0.00264
(.00082)
N=41
0.00904
( .00223)
N=112
0.00039
( .00023)
N=263
0.00113
(.00049)
N=91
0.00425
(.0016)
N=172
P+2 0.00087
(.00027)
N=137
0.00242
(.00111)
N=4
0.00889
(.00211)
N=109
0.00013
(.00017)
N=2 61
0.00129
( .00062)
N=88
0.00346
(.00151)
N=170
)
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TABLE 19
High-low Spread Relative To Average For Large Nondual Trades
The high-low price spread Pj for the j-th large trade is compared to its average over the
previous 8 days. The reported statistic is p,=2j_°[P
tj
~ P]/Soj» where P tj is the high-low price
spread t intervals from the interval in which j-th large futures trade occurred and S^ is the
index value at t=0. n is the number of large trades, t takes on values from -2 to +2, i.e.
two half-hour time intervals before and after the j-th interval. Buy'i' and Sell'i' indicate
large nondual purchases and sales for sample period i. Sample period 1 is the pre-rule change
period, 2 is the post-change but pre-crash period and 3 is the post-change post-crash period.
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. N indicates the number of observations.
Buyl Buy2 Buy3 Selll Sell2 Sell3
P-2 0.00091 0.0006 0.00237 0.0016 0.00166 0.00204
(.00045) (.00063) (.0014) (.00049) ( .00052) (.00126)
N=71 N=2 3 N=222 N=125 N=50 N=248
P-l 0.00057 0.00099 0.00234 0.0015 0.00113 0.00227
( .00045) (.0007) (.0012) ( .00036) (.00039) (.00109)
N=77 N=2 5 N=2 61 N=146 N=65 N=290
Po 0.00009 0.00161 0.00126 0.00069 0.00133 0.00106
(.00032) (.00131) ( .00112) (.0003) (.00057) (.001)
N=77 N=2 5 N=2 61 N=146 N=65 N=290
P+l 0.00054 0.00218 0.00074 0.00065 0.00169 0.0008
(.00055) (.00166) (.00114) (.00042) (.00073) (.00104)
N=7 6 N=2 5 N=259 N=146 N=64 N=28 5
P+2 0.00005 -.00039 0.00033 0.00052 0.00182 0.0005
(.00032) (.00029) (.0011) ( .00026) ( .02905) (.001)
N=7 3 N=24 N=255 N=145 N=64 N=279
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Figure 1
Total Dual Trading Volume
for Different Time Brackets
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Figure 2
Total Non-Dual Trading Volume
for Different Time Brackets
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Figure 5
Total Number of Dual Trading Transactions
for Different Time Brackets
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Figure 6
Total Number of Non-Dual Trading Transactions
for Different Time Brackets
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Figure 7
Intraday Variation of Large Purchases
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Daily Variation In Large Dual Buys
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Daily Variation In Large Nondual Buys
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ntraday Variation of Large Sales
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Daily Variation In Large Nondual Sales
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